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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the rise of defense spending in the United 
States. It is important to study the causation of increased U.S. defense spending because 
it currently holds the largest defense expenditure in the world, especially in most recent 
years. I am interested in understanding the reasoning behind these appropriated defense 
budgets. There are multiple factors to consider in determining the relationship between 
defense spending and the logic that justifies it. The use of federal resources and federal 
budgeting are a political process that has become a central issue in terms of government 
overspending for national defense. Funding for the Department of Defense and other 
budget sectors within the defense budget have risen substantially and have grown more 
rapidly than the U.S. ever initially projected.  
  International threats, competition, and executive policymaking have also had a 
large effect on our government’s military budgets. This work will look at the major and 
lagging variables to determine the underlying cause of increased U.S. defense spending. 
The theories I have chosen to provide a plausible perspective on the rationale behind 
defense expenditure are Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and the Keynesian School of 
Thought.  
Thesis Statement: While Keynesian theorists, Borsch and Wallace, conject that 
increased defense expenditure is a result of the government’s pursuit to sustain a 
permanent war economy in an attempt to stimulate the nation’s economic growth, their 
findings cannot fully prove such premise. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), is more 
capable of explaining the underlying cause for heightened defense spending in the U.S. 
Introduced by author Travis Sharp, PET focuses on government entities whom use 
policymaking and increased discretionary spending to their own advantage.  
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1. Introduction 
It is important to study the causation of U.S. increased defense spending because 
it currently holds the largest defense expenditure in the world, especially in most recent 
years. Defense spending has the difficult task of coordinating and budgeting a 
government’s limited resources in order to accomplish specific military goals and 
objectives.1 Defense spending consists of costs that include operations and maintenance, 
military research and development, employing military and civil personnel, social 
services, as well as military aid.2  
As stated by author Travis Sharp in his journal article, Tying US Defense 
Spending to GDP, Bad Logic Bad Policy, “When there are more threats, a nation spends 
more, when there are fewer threats, it spends less. As threats evolve, funding should 
evolve along with them. In short, defense spending should be determined according to a 
threat-based analysis and budgetary survival of the fittest” (Sharp 2008, 16).3 It is 
understood that there is an established necessity to safeguard the U.S. through 
advancements, innovation, and defense capabilities in order to ensure that it is able to 
keep up with, as well as persevere against international threats.4 Although, Sharp explains 
 
1 Sharp, Travis. "Tying US Defense Spending to GDP: Bad Logic, Bad Policy." Parameters 38, 
no. 3 (Autumn, 2008): 5-17. http://ezproxy.montclair.edu:2048/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.montclair.edu/docview/198031354?accountid=12536. 
 
2 Perlo-Freeman, Sam and Carina Solmirano. “Trends in World Military Expenditure 2013.” SIPRI, 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Apr. 2014, sipri.org. 
 
3 Sharp, “Tying US Defense Spending to GDP: Bad Logic, Bad Policy”, 16.  
 
4 Heeley, Laicie “Military Spending: For A New Strategic Reality.” Stimson Center (2017) 1-16.      
   www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10851  
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the function of defense spending in simple terms, there are alternative arguments that 
evaluate the logic behind inflated defense spending. 
2. Theories  
2.1 Keynesianism  
Prior to conducting research on increased defense spending in the U.S. under the 
Keynesian dynamic, I was under the impression that it was due to increased threats and 
other nations seeking to achieve world superiority. If there was a threat to the nation, I 
assumed that would be the main reason to proliferate and expand military budgets. While 
researching different authors’ perspectives on the Keynesian school of thought, there are 
similar points made with reference to the reasoning behind inflated defense spending. 
Keynesianism is a notable yet oppositional theory, in certain aspects, with respect to the 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), which I will later elaborate on in the following 
section. As claimed by Professors’ Borsch and Wallace in their journal article, Military 
Keynesianism In the Post-Vietnam War Era: A View from the American States, the end of 
the Cold War introduced a “new Military” that would be characterized by a reduction in 
the size of the army and an increase in technologically advanced weapons systems.5 
This period witnessed a downsizing in the military that was unprecedented in U.S. 
history. Accordingly, the post-Cold War era was illustrated as an unrivaled supremacy of 
the U.S. military. During this Cold War period, social scientists developed a new school 
of thought with reference to the U.S. government’s military spending, the Keynesian 
 
5Wallace, Michael, et al. “Military Keynesianism In the Post-Vietnam War Era: A View from the 
American States.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 36 (2008) 215-240. 
http://ezproxy.montclair.edu:2048/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.montclair.edu/docview/206652791?accountid=12536 
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School of Thought. The Second World War and Cold War had motivated the U.S. to 
pursue its dominance in worldwide politics by gaining a military-political leadership 
role.6 The drive to maintain global military superiority propelled the U.S. to pursue the 
idea of a “permanent war economy”. This dynamic approach identifies national defense 
as an aspect of state spending that can increase output in contrast to ineffective demands.7 
Furthermore, defense spending during this period became labeled as “military 
Keynesianism”, a term that emphasizes expansive production and demand of U.S. goods 
during moments of recession or high unemployment. Since there was a large decrease in 
the size of the military, the U.S. would have to depend on other forms of defense to boost 
the economy. Defense spending, therefore, became the new asset to enhance the economy 
through efforts of production of military goods and its supply chains.8  
Accordingly, in Professors’ Uk Heo and John Bohte’s journal article, Who Pays 
for National Defense? Financing Defense Programs in the United States, 1947—2007, 
the authors give supplemental background to the Military Keynesian theory by 
confirming that since the 1950’s, the U.S. has annually spent about 3 to 13 percent of its 
gross domestic product9 on military expenses for involvement in wars and efforts to 
 
6Eloranta, Jari. “Military Spending Patterns in History”. EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert 
Whaples. September 16, 2005. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/military-spending-patterns-in-
history/  
 
7Dunne, Paul, and Nan Tian. “Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Survey.” 
www.espjournal.org.uk, The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2013, 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/506f/866f5921827998d1ae872984820e2333c6f0.pdf 
 
8Cox, Ronald W. (2014) "The Military-Industrial Complex and US Military Spending After 9/11," 
Class, Race and Corporate Power: Vol. 2, Iss. 2, Article 5. 1-22. 
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1
&article=1027&context=classracecorporatepower 
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stimulate the economy.10 It is clear to see that the U.S. has been dedicated in its efforts to 
exceed its economic state through military products for years.  
The reason I mentioned that Keynesianism was relevant to this research was 
because Professors Borsch and Wallace contend that the application of Military 
Keynesianism and the adoption of a permanent war economy can affect a nation 
negatively. They argue that applying Keynesian theory to justify higher defense spending 
can lead to consequences such as, elevated unemployment, reduced profitability of firms, 
and increases in market concentration of capitalist firms. In fact, Wallace and Borsch 
further inform us that Military Keynesianism is the government’s assumption and naiveté 
of an ever-increasing defense budget. The expectation of a government to perceive that 
 
9Freeman, Sam Perlo, and Carina Solmirano. “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2013.” 
SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2014) 1-8.                    
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/FS/SIPRIFS1404.pdf 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is an important independent variable to consider when 
researching what factors drive the defense budget to increase and compare it to other countries. 
GDP is a tool of measurement used by nations to figure out how much they can afford to spend 
on defense budgets. On the other hand, GDP does not act as a proper guide as to how much the 
U.S. actually should be spending. Accordingly, America’s GDP is about seven times larger today 
in contrast to what it was in 1950. Sharp makes a great example by arguing that governments 
viewing defense spending as a historically low percentage of GDP, thus implementing it should 
be increased, is comparable to a landlord arguing that a tenant’s rent should be increased if they 
receive a pay raise. GDP should serve as a reference to “stimulate discussion relative to the 
affordability of increased defense spending in a challenging security environment. If the American 
economy doubles in size, should American taxpayers be required to double the Pentagon’s 
budget as well? Should future generations spend three times more on defense just because they 
are three times wealthier?” Sharp advises that the answer is no because of the following, “If GDP 
decreases, would the U.S. military be supportive of a parallel reduction in its budget? China 
currently devotes more of its GDP to defense than the U.S., but the U.S. spends more in absolute 
terms and gets better performance out of its investment due to a more modernized economy, as 
well as retaining a clear advantage in  military power. Therefore, GDP is not an accurate variable 
to focus on when deciding how much money a nation can spend on military expenditure. 
However, it is important to consider when comparing how international countries budget their 
defense spending in contrast to the U.S. In the following section, I will focus on how other 
countries decide to appropriate their defense budgets through examining the affiliated factors.                                                                             
 
10Heo, Uk, and John Bohte. "Who Pays for National Defense? Financing Defense Programs in 
the United States, 1947—2007." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 3 (2012) 413-38. 
www.jstor.org/stable/23248794  
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there will always be a secured budget and additional appropriated funding, can be viewed 
as irresponsible and risky. They explain that the idea behind increasing production of 
defense to drive a jeopardized economy may have worked for the U.S. post-World War I, 
however, that is not the case in each scenario. In their research, Borsch and Wallace and 
their colleagues examine the causes of increased defense spending in connection with 
Keynesianism. Their data compared and contrasted 18 capitalist countries and found that 
higher defense spending did decrease unemployment, which is consistent with Keynesian 
theory, however, it was also discovered that increased defense expenditure impedes 
economic growth. Therefore, Military Keynesianism can reinforce and simultaneously 
hinder a nation’s economy by spending more on defense capabilities.11 
With reference to the end of the Cold War, long-term centralization of power 
within the executive branch was becoming prominent. Therefore, this furthers that 
Keynesianism and the post-Cold War era added to the centralization of the executive 
branch power, which has contributed to defining threats that favors bureaucracies whom 
have control over intelligence resources. Accordingly, the Defense Department controls 
80 percent of intelligence spending; therefore, it is able to exert a significant amount of 
influence over the threat definition and recommendations for allocated resources to 
respond to such threats.12 The Keynesian dynamic adopted by governments cannot be 
placed completely at fault for the augmentation in defense spending because it solely 
focuses on the U.S. obtaining political and military control worldwide. In addition, it 
 
11Wallace, Michael and Casey Borch. "Military Spending and Economic Well-Being in the 
American States: The Post-Vietnam War Era." Social Forces 88, no. 4 (2010) 1727-1752. 
www.jstor.org/stable/40645956.   
 
12 Cox, 16. 
  9 
centers on the military sector of the defense budget rather than all departments of 
defense. Therefore, the Keynesian School of Thought cannot be substantiated to be the 
sole explanation behind the rise of defense spending in the U.S. However, it does add to 
the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) by maintaining that executive policymaking 
power is a large influence on the federal budget, which I will explain in the next section 
regarding PET. The following sub-section analyzes the Military Industrial Complex 
(MIC), which provides framework with reference to patterns of military spending and the 
strength of the MIC influence.  
2.2 Military Industrial Complex  
Authors Paul Dunne and Nan Tian introduce an interesting notion further looking 
into the Keynesian approach. In the eyes of the state, increased military spending can 
result in increased capacity, profits, investment, as well as growth. However, Dunne and 
Tian have noted a particular scheme comprised of a powerful interest group which is 
orchestrated by individuals, firms, and organizations whom directly benefit from 
increasing defense spending. This group composed of powerful interest is referenced as 
the military industrial complex (MIC). There are more key actors involved in the MIC 
whom benefit from military spending such as military contractors, defense and 
intelligence bureaucracies, congressional representatives, senators, and policy-planning 
organizations.13  
 
13 Cox, Ronald W. "The Military-Industrial Complex and US Military Spending After 9/11," Class, 
Race and Corporate Power (2014) Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 5. 1-22. 
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=classracecorporatepow
er 
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Author Ronald Cox references his perspective on the MIC in his article “The 
Military-Industrial Complex and US Military Spending After 9/11. He focuses on the elite 
power theory that the military-industrial complex holds, as well as owes a huge debt.14 
He notes that C. Wright Mills, a professor of U.S. academic history, theorized about the 
influence of corporate interests within the political process. Mills emphasized a sequence 
of interests that connected the growth of large-scale bureaucracies, such as the Defense 
Department, with firms that profited from military procurement. Networks of interests 
benefitting from military spending has made it difficult to change the embedded priorities 
of a military allocation system that profited from perceptions of threats to the security of 
the U.S. 15 
As mentioned aforehand, there is pressure put on members under executive 
power, such as the President, to heighten military budgets even without proper 
justification or impending threat. The pressure placed to increase military budgets is 
unjustifiable without presenting a clear and eminent threat to the U.S. As Keynesianism 
has proven, ever since WWII, U.S. policymaking has heightened the influence of the 
military-industrial complex by centralizing authority for decision making in the executive 
branch, as well as producing an array of bureaucracies whose success is justified by the 
presence of an external threat. Cox provides us with an insightful notion that spending 
decisions are the product of a complex set of negotiations between powerful political and 
 
14 Cox, 1. Elite power theorists working in the C. Wright Mills tradition have long argued that the 
constellation of interests comprising the military-industrial complex have helped determine, shape 
and refine the definition of “national interest” in order to maximize profits and to protect access to 
resources. This school acknowledges that the military-industrial complex does not define 
“national interest” in a vacuum but is forced to compete with other powerful corporate interest 
groups over how to define “national interest.”  
 
15 Cox, 1. 
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economic actors.16 Therefore, to reiterate, the MIC increases military expenditure by 
implementing pressure on the state when there is no threat identified to justify such 
expenditure.17 The MIC is a significant causal factor in U.S. military spending by having 
the duty to identify the “threat definition” used by policymakers and its relationship to the 
levels of U.S. military spending, especially after events such as 9/11.18  
It is crucial to analyze the corporations and bureaucracies whom work together to 
identify threats to the U.S. national security because they may be seeking to maximize 
their access to government revenues and tax dollars. This is a major conflict of interest 
added into the mix. The MIC furthers the PET theory that executive officials, as well as 
members of the MIC, are entities who directly use defense budgets and additional 
funding to their personal advantage.19 The balance of institutional and economic power is 
in favor of the MIC, to the point where corporate, executive branch, Congressional and 
bureaucratic allies are linked to patronage regarding the maintenance of high levels of 
military spending.20 Military Keynesianism centers on military expenditures, as well as 
the MIC, rather than all departments of defense. Therefore, the Keynesian School of 
Thought cannot be the appropriate explanation behind the rise of defense spending in the 
U.S. On the other hand, the MIC provides substantial clarity that supports the PET theory 
and maintains the notion that executive policymaking power is largely responsible.  
 
 
16 Cox, 1. 
 
17 Dunne and Tian, “Military Expenditure and Economic Growth; A Survey”, 6.   
 
18 Cox, 14.  
 
19 Cox, 3. 
 
20 Cox, 17.  
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2.3 Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
 Over the past 25 years, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) has helped explain 
budget outcomes in the U.S. and worldwide.21 According to Sharp, U.S. defense 
budgeting conforms with Punctuated Equilibrium Theory’s conception of policymaking. 
In Sharp’s article, Wars, Presidents, and Punctuated Equilibriums in US Defense 
Spending, PET is an information processing theory of decision-making that illustrates 
policymaking as a grand scheme. PET explains that rational decision-makers in charge of 
defense budgets do not have the time, information, nor cognitive capacity to solve all 
budget issues (Sharp 371).22 Therefore, the decision makers controlling defense budgets 
may delegate such responsibility to other forms of authority. PET infers that there is an 
interaction between two components during decision-making, that is, policymaker 
attention and policy subsystem structures which include legislators, agencies, etc. 
Accordingly, the interaction between these two elements causes defense budgets to 
snowball from one equilibrium to another within a short amount of time (Sharp 373).23 
 Sharp further informs us that there are distinct circumstances that will “punctuate” 
the U.S. defense spending equilibrium, thus, causing a large affect to defense budgets. A 
punctuation can be understood as a component or event that may cause a substantial 
increase or decrease in the defense budget for definitive reasons. Sharp indicates that a 
defense spending punctuation materializes, for example, when the U.S. enters or 
 
21 Sharp, “Wars, Presidents, and Punctuated Equilibriums in US Defense Spending”, 371. 
 
22Sharp, Travis. “Wars, presidents, and punctuated equilibriums in US defense spending.” Policy       
   Sci 52 (2019) 367–396. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-019-09349-z  
 
23Sharp, “Wars, Presidents, and Punctuated Equilibriums in US Defense Spending”, 373.   
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withdraws from a war, or there is a presidential transition in the works.24 Furthermore, a 
punctuation will not occur if a war policy shift, a presidential transition, or both, does not 
take place first.25  
 I would like to elaborate further on PET punctuations to defense budgets and how 
they could manifest as a result of wartime or changeover of presidency. Accordingly, a 
nation preparing for war will cause punctuations to their prepared defense budget as a 
result of the need for necessary equipment and personnel. Depending on the 
circumstances, the costs to obtain ammunition, fuel, medical supplies, intelligence, and 
vehicles can enlarge the budget substantially (Sharp 375).26 It is possible to produce 
budgets ahead of time in order to prepare for a military emergency or crisis. However, 
such a scenario also leaves a window of opportunity for executive officials to invest in 
items that are not directly affiliated with wartime operations. An example would be 
advocates of robust conventional deterrence27 whom have a say of what is included in the 
defense budget. These advocates might encourage utilizing defense funding as a way to 
upgrade our government’s defense equipment in exchange for high-tech weapons (Sharp 
375). The notion of increasing defense expenditure to upgrade a nation’s armed forces in 
 
24Sharp, “Wars, Presidents, and Punctuated Equilibriums in US Defense Spending”, 368.   
Punctuations merit special attention because they supply theoretical insights, set institutional 
trajectories, and shape aspirations for future policy. Spending punctuations pose the most 
stressing tests imaginable for bureaucracies. 
 
25Sharp, “Wars, Presidents, and Punctuated Equilibriums in US Defense Spending”, 374.   
 
26Sharp, “Wars, Presidents, and Punctuated Equilibriums in US Defense Spending”, 375.   
 
27“Conventional Deterrence: An Interview with John J. Mearsheimer.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 
July 15, 2018. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/. 
Conventional deterrence is about persuading an adversary not to initiate a war because the 
expected costs and risks outweigh the anticipated benefits.  
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order to prepare for war is advantageous, should there be such a need for modernization. 
On the other hand, if there is no need for modernizing weapons to the highest extent, or if 
the weapons have little to no function in war, then the concept is completely 
ambiguous.28  
 During a U.S. presidential election and transition, there are several aspects 
involved that would cause a punctuation in defense spending to surface. For example, 
during election campaigns, there are promises made and proposals introduced in order to 
help a candidate seem more attractive, especially when involving defense strategy or 
security. People want to feel safe in their country and may lean towards the candidate that 
offers the utmost level of protection. In particular, should there be a visible threat in the 
international environment, candidates will use this to their advantage to promote 
increasing the government’s defense expenditure in order to persevere against such 
threat.29 However, such commitments made may not be as clear cut once a candidate has 
entered into office post-election. 
 After entering office, a new president may have too much on their plate to 
address every matter, therefore, they recruit political appointees to oversee policymaking. 
These appointees have the power to reshape the policy subsystem structure while 
simultaneously satisfying the president’s priorities, as well as their own. Such issue 
illustrates a conflict of interest and also leaves room for biased decision making. The 
original proposals that the presidential candidate had previously given his/her word on, 
 
28 Sharp, “Wars, Presidents, and Punctuated Equilibriums in US Defense Spending”, 375.   
 
29 Sharp, “Wars, Presidents, and Punctuated Equilibriums in US Defense Spending”, 375-376. 
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can easily change upon entering office as a result of undue influence or personal 
motivation.30      
 The explanation provided by Sharp in his article, Wars, Presidents, Punctuated 
Equilibriums in US Defense Spending and Tying US Defense Spending to GDP: Bad 
Logic, Bad Policy, substantiates a plausible explanation for dramatically increased and 
appropriated defense budgets. PET identifies that a new presidency’s policymaking in the 
U.S. or the U.S. entering war would uphold the reasoning for dramatic changes in the 
defense budget. However, it is important to note that the U.S. has not been involved in 
any major wars in the last few years. It is understood that the U.S. experienced major 
warfare during the 20th century due to the War on Terror beginning 2001. However, 
defense expenditure minimized after the Obama Administration and has risen once again 
since President Trump entered office. Thus, as mentioned, since the U.S. has not 
experienced any major wars in most recent years, what is the reasoning for requested 
additional funding for the U.S. Defense Budget each year thereafter?  
I have been enticed to believe that PET obtains logic which proves that direct 
executive authority uses their power in policymaking in order to maximize defense 
expenditure to their benefit. Since there is currently no immediate threat to the U.S., why 
is the president requesting additional funding towards the defense budget? Is there in fact 
an amount of pressure being placed on the president to maintain inflated defense 
budgets? The issue to be concerned about in this section is the lack of transparency by 
executive power in order to justify that all funding is directly appropriated for necessary 
defense equipment and armed forces.  
 
30 Sharp, “Wars, Presidents, and Punctuated Equilibriums in US Defense Spending”, 377.   
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 In addition to Sharp’s articles, there is supplemental research to support his theory 
behind dramatically increased defense spending due to executive policymaking. In Heo 
and Bohte’s article, Who Pays for National Defense? Financing Defense Programs in the 
United States, the authors present the argument that there is indeed manipulation of 
defense spending in order to pursue personal motives. Moreover, it is not limited to 
election periods because they propose that "It is reasonable to expect that the president 
would be willing to tweak the economy in order to heighten his public image. It is critical 
for the president to leave a positive influence within Congress in order to obtain public 
approval and pass legislation.”31 This demonstrates an area of concern because it is fair to 
say that U.S. presidents can disguise their biased or ulterior motives as beneficial and 
monumentous actions to boost the economy. Their motivation to drive defense budgets 
higher may not always derive from a place of concern nor integrity. This research further 
supports the argument of PET, which can directly explain the drive for increased defense 
budgets. 
Heo and Bohte provide additional support to PET by presenting a significant 
element of policymaking within the federal budget. In their journal article, Who Pays for 
National Defense? Financing Defense Programs in the United States, 1947—2007, it is 
demonstrated that presidents utilize defense spending to their advantage in multiple ways. 
For example, increasing funding for defense purposes is used to reduce unemployment so 
that presidents can gain approval and heighten their chances for reelection in the near 
 
31 Heo, Uk and John Bohte. "Who Pays for National Defense? Financing Defense Programs in 
the United States, 1947—2007." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 3 (2012) 413-38.            
   www.jstor.org/stable/23248794  
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future. Although, defense spending is beneficial in aiding to reduce unemployment, those 
who actually benefit are direct hires of the Department of Defense, as well as firms and 
industries that produce military goods and services. Furthermore, a noteworthy insight 
regarding defense spending is that it is the largest discretionary spending fund for 
presidents to use at their complete discretion.32 From my perspective and the information 
presented on this theory, it would not be false to assume that PET is the root explanation 
for increased defense spending as a result of abused policymaking power. 
3. International Defense Spending   
Defense expenditure is an important element for international countries and their 
economies in relation to levels of security. In order for a country or nation to be able to 
address internal and external threats, they must have a substantial defense system set in 
place to stand firm against intimidating forces. For example, in developing countries, 
they may be limited to certain levels of armed production capabilities.33 Countries 
worldwide are diverse in their reasoning for increasing their armed forces, defense 
expenditure, and arms exporting.  
In contrast to the U.S., each country has a different logic as to why they agree on 
increased funding for defense in order to maintain security. For example, in Central 
America and the Caribbean, military spending continued to grow rapidly in 2013 in the 
 
32 Heo et al., "Who Pays for National Defense? Financing Defense Programs in the United 
States, 1947—2007", 424. 
 
33 Dunne, Paul et al., “Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Survey”, 7.  
  18 
wake of continuing drug cartel-related violence.34 The same year, Ghana more than 
doubled its military spending from $109 million in 2012 to $306 million in 2013. 
According to the budget statement, the budget will allow continued modernization of the 
armed forces, which are heavily involved in international peacekeeping operations.35 The 
reasons for the country of Algeria’s increased defense spending was due its desire for the 
threat of terrorism, the powerful role of the military, regional power status, and the 
availability of oil funds (Perlo-Freeman et al. 4).  Referencing the PET theory, power 
struggle is at the center for the upsurge in defense expenditure in this region. Other 
countries, such as Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Paraguay and Swaziland, enjoy 
essentially peaceful security environments, therefore, they do not focus on increasing 
their defense expenditure as a necessary element.36 
The largest increases of military spending in 2013 were in Iraq and Bahrain as a 
result of the purchases of arms used to suppress domestic unrest and troubled relations 
with Iran. In most recent years, increases in Iraq defense systems connected to building 
capacity and armaments of the Iraqi armed forces in order to improve the security of 
citizens, access to services, as well as protection of oil production and exports. China, 
which is now the world’s second-largest military spender, allotted $250 billion to its 
 
34 Freeman, Sam Perlo, and Carina Solmirano. “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2013.” 
SIPRI. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2014) 1-8.                    
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/FS/SIPRIFS1404.pdf 
 
35 Perlo-Freeman et al., “Trends in World Military Expenditure 2013”, 4.  
 
36 Perlo-Freeman et al., “Trends in World Military Expenditure 2013”, 7.  
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military in 2018, rising for the 24th consecutive year and almost ten times larger than the 
budget in 1994.37  
After examining the various reasons for countries to proliferate, security threats and 
competition hold a substantial impact regarding changes in military expenditure.38 These 
factors are constant in analyzing international defense spending. There are international 
competitor states that possess the capacity to be able to diminish the U.S. Department of 
Defense’s military technological advantages. Competitors such as Korea, China, and 
Russia have maintained their objective to increase defense expenditure to succeed beyond 
the frontier of warfare proficiency. The increasing innovation of technologically 
advanced weaponry has given the U.S. no other choice to but to persevere against such 
powerful countries.39 The notion of a great power competition has become the 
predominant challenge that jeopardizes the U.S. national security and can be the justified 
factor to proliferate. Great power competition means new advancements for force, design, 
posture, and warfighting.40 
Korea has become the new nuclear threat that is currently thriving in the 
international arms competition. Accordingly, under the Trump Administration there is 
apparent on-going friction with the advances of North Korea’s nuclear program and U.S. 
 
37 Tian et al., “Trends in World Military Expenditure 2018,” 3. 
38Dunne, Paul and Nan Tian. “Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Survey.” The  
   Economics of Peace and Security Journal 8, no. 1 (2013) 1–7.      
   https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.15355/epsj.8.1.5. 
39 United States Department of Defense, “Defense Budget Overview: Fiscal Year 2020 Budget           
   Request”, 46.   
 
40 United States Department of Defense, “Defense Budget Overview: Irreversible Implementation       
   of the National Defense Strategy”, 1. 
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foreign policy.41 In addition to there being friction with the U.S., there is also tension in 
other sub-regions of Korea. In the Korean Peninsula, there is an ongoing altercation 
between North Korea and South Korea. Between China and Japan, there is hostility over 
the claims of the East China Sea. These tensions and hostility help governments to 
continue to find justification to mobilize, modernize their military capabilities, and 
heighten military spending.42 While North Korea has depicted their willingness to 
consider a less aggressive stance to its neighbors, their overall actions continue despite 
the United Nation’s censure and sanctions.43  
China is considered a strategic competitor because of its constant escalated funding 
for defense capabilities. China uses predatory economics to intimidate its competitors 
while militarizing features in the South China Sea. They follow the strict policy of 
linking growth in military spending with economic growth. From 2009-2018, China’s 
defense spending expenditures grew by 83% under President Xi Jinping’s power. “No 
one has ever presided over anywhere close to this level of Chinese military development 
in Chinese history before Xi,” notes Andrew Erickson, a professor at the US Naval War 
College.44 The spending between America and China has boosted in exchange for the 
 
41 Heeley, “Military Spending: For A New Strategic Reality”, 12.  
42 Tian, Nan, et al. “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016.” ETH Zurich, Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (2017) 1-9. https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-
library/articles/article.html/1fb0e237-d0e6-40f6-8de1-27e47b00df01/pdf 
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primacy in Asia. The boost reflected the Trump administration’s prospect of great power 
competition with Russia and China, which consisted of requiring pricier weapons.45 
Insofar, China has led us to believe that it possesses one of the largest militaries in 
the world and is presenting itself as a powerful combatant to the United States. 46 
Although, there is recognition that China is advancing its armed forces, it is currently not 
an eminent threat to the U.S. The U.S. state of national security would have to in fact be 
in danger in order for the government to dramatically increase defense capabilities. It is 
reasonable to say that the U.S. would address countries such as China as a threat, when 
actually they are just competing against the U.S. capabilities to see who the superpower 
country will be. Keynesianism, a permanent war economy theory, would be a more 
applicable theory for measuring variables of threats and competition as the driving factors 
that lead defense expenditure. Threats and competition are important factors to consider 
when examining U.S. defense budgeting, however, those two elements cannot prove PET 
theory, nor amount to be the cause for the $740 billion budget request of 2021.  
4. 2020-2021 Fiscal Year Budget Request 
A large portion of the defense budget is determined by the president because they 
are given a substantial amount of control over it. The president has a large influence 
which brings us to the question of whether the president or Congress uses defense 
spending to stimulate economic growth. The more funding there is, the more room there 
is to spend and waste unnecessary money. Military spending is currently the second-
largest item in the federal budget as the figure amounts to more than the $705 billion 
 
45 Tian et al., “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2018,” 6.  
 
46 United States Department of Defense, “Defense Budget Overview: Irreversible Implementation 
of the National Defense Strategy”, 1. 
  22 
outlined by the Department of Defense.47 The Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 budget has financed 
the largest research and development request in the past 70 years in order to focus on 
technologies necessary for a top tier fight.48  
 On February 10, 2020, President Donald J. Trump sent Congress a proposed FY 
2021 Budget Request of $740.5 billion for national security. Of that amount, $705.4 
billion is allocated to the Department of Defense. This budget focuses on priorities of 
nuclear deterrence recapitalization, homeland missile defense, air, land, sea, space and 
cyber domains.49 The Department of Defense is concerned that the U.S. technological 
and capability advantages are diminishing, thus the push for further investments in areas 
that advance the U.S. in terms of competition. In order for the U.S. to assert itself as 
superior in the international system, it requires sufficient funding to do so.50  
In previous budgets such as, FY 2017, the budget requested additional resources to 
arrest near-term readiness atrophy. In 2018, the FY budget began to restore readiness and 
filled the holes in military forces resulting from sustained operational commitments and 
budgetary instability. In 2019, the FY budget sought to restore readiness and filled holes 
in the military forces. In FY 2020, the fiscal year budget requested prioritization of 
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innovation and modernization in order to strengthen the country’s competitive 
advantage.51   
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) budget has increased from $384 billion to $502 
billion between the years of 2000-2014. The 2019 Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP), which comprises the Department of Defense’s budget request submitted to 
Congress, anticipates that base-budget levels will average about $650 billion per year 
between 2019-2023. 52 The DoD is comprised of personnel that are given the 
responsibility to maintain U.S. defense objectives such as magnify the U.S. lethality, 
sustain preparedness, and efficiently manage active military personnel and contracted 
services. Thus, the DoD requires the government’s additional capital resources and skills 
to provide for the Nation’s defense.53 It is the Department’s responsibility to sustain 
efforts to avoid current threats such as Iran, North Korea, and violent extremist threats 
towards the United States.54 This subsection regarding the budget adds support to the 
PET theory to explain inflated defense budgets in the U.S. because it regards and 
confirms the amount of power the executive has over the budget. In addition, there are 
multiple factors, such as perceived threats and influence by departments to increase the 
budget to build up armed forces. Undue influence, personal motivations, and threats to 
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the economy are all aspects that have effect on the budget request, which further 
reassures the executive power of policymaking, as mentioned in PET theory.  
4.1 The Budget Control Act of 1974 
The 1974 Congressional Budget & Impoundment Act (CBA) is utilized to 
concentrate on Congress' budget authority. In addition, it maintains the regulations to 
reduce the President's authority, set institutional changes, and help Congress regain 
power over budget processing. The 1974 CBA controls the budget by dividing the 
withholding of funds. The withholding of funds is meant for rescissions, deferrals, 
required rescissions to be approved by Congress, etc.55 It is interesting that the CBA is 
sought to reduce the president’s authority over the budget, as if there were prior events 
that led to necessary downsizing in the president’s power. 
The 1974 Congressional Budget & Impoundment Act was inspired and created as a 
result of former President Richard Nixon's refusal to disburse $12 billions of appropriated 
funds through executive power. It was stated that President Nixon had “fears” about 
budget deficit, thus, claiming it would cause higher inflation. Therefore, it would not be 
unreasonable to assume that when the U.S. is facing a major deficit, it may influence the 
president or other forms of executive power to increase the funding for the defense. 
Additionally, this Act was also passed as a result of the Pentagon’s reprogramming of 
funding for which Congress had previously disapproved. There had been underlying 
secrecy going on within the budget and its appropriated funding. Subsequent to Nixon's 
impoundment, Congress officially passed the 1974 Congressional Budget and 
 
55 “1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act”, 2.  
 
  25 
Impoundment Act over Nixon’s veto.56 Lack of transparency and hidden secrecy 
regarding defense budgets and its appropriated spending are not an unprecedented issue. 
It is important to note this Act regarding defense spending because there has been 
evidence in the abuse of policymaking power through the use of the defense budget.  
5. Future Outlooks of U.S. Defense Expenditure   
Increased costs in some areas of support have in-fact improved efficiency in the 
defense sector. Enlarged support has aided in meeting military needs, expanding 
productivity, and decreasing costs in other fields. For example, the growth in funding for 
the Department of Defense’s communications infrastructure and science and technology 
programs have improved DoD’s overall combat capability in the face of new threats. 
Increased investment in tools and machinery can be put to blame for the increases in 
spending on maintenance and other support activities. 57 
 The Congressional Budget Office has obtained projections and estimates which 
reveal that defense expenditure after 2024 will be overwhelmingly faster than the rate of 
inflation. Within the CBO’s findings, the main factors prompting rises in the Department 
of Defense’s budget are financing the costs of compensation for military personnel, 
operation and maintenance, as well as acquisition of weapon systems in order to measure 
up to the department’s modernization goals and objectives.58 It is considerable that the 
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DOD faces difficulties in being able to be efficient in spending. According to the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Department of Defense lacks market-based 
incentives that could resolve issues regarding minimization of budgets.59 The personnel 
that the government trusts with control of the federal budget, specifically, the defense 
budget aspects, should be anything but inefficient in budget planning. Those whom 
decide how much money and what should be appropriated as necessary for the defense 
budget, are clearly not equipped to handle such responsibility if the CBO themselves are 
accusing the DoD of lacking important economic incentive. Furthering the backing to the 
PET theory, it is clear that executive power and policy subsystems directly have a large 
effect on defense expenditure. Therefore, it is not critical to find out what drives the 
budget, but who. 
6. Conclusion  
 It is important to research U.S. increased defense spending because it now holds 
the largest defense expenditure. The future issues of increased defense spending can lead 
to further deficit and lack of transparency if it is not addressed. In examining the 
conclusions of Professors’ Borch and Wallace, they conclude that state actors evidently 
use military spending as a fiscal policy to avoid economic recession. Moreover, Military 
Keynesianism does function as a successful instrument for accomplishing economic 
outcomes while also obtaining support for state manager entities.60 The findings set forth 
in Borsch and Wallace’s article, Military Keynesianism In the Post-Vietnam War Era: A 
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View from the American States, of the Keynesian dynamic to explain defense spending, 
does not fully account for the main cause of increases in the U.S. defense budgets. In my 
perspective and the information presented on PET theory, I assert that PET is the most 
plausible logic for increased defense budgets due to direct executive influence. 
Keynesianism and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory are independent from one 
another; however, the variable of economy was a constant between the two theories. 
Moreover, I am in complete agreeance with author Travis Sharp in his reporting of 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory as the underlying cause of increased defense spending. 
The claims in his article, Wars, Presidents, and Punctuated Equilibriums in US Defense 
Spending, provide substance that presidents and other forms of influence have used 
defense expenditure as a grand scheme to fulfill personal motivations. The personal 
motivations can also be linked to their commitment to boost the U.S. economy in order to 
heighten their reputation and their Administration’s stature. As mentioned, each president 
has the drive and goal to make decisions within their administration that will publicize 
them as a benefactor to Congress, the U.S. government, and the American people.61 
There is a sustained pressure placed on each president who enters office, that is, to be 
superior and surpass the expectations from the previous Administration. As stated in Heo 
and Bohte’s article, Who Pays for National Defense? Financing Defense Programs in the 
United States, “It is critical for the president to leave a positive influence within Congress 
in order to obtain public approval and pass legislation.”62  
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In referencing President Trump’s introduction speech in beginning of the Fiscal 
Year 2021 Budget Request, he states “Over the past 3 years, my Administration has 
worked tirelessly to restore America’s economic strength. We have ended the war on 
American workers and stopped the assault on American industry, launching an economic 
boom the likes of which we have never seen before.” From my standpoint, the president 
focuses on the nation of the U.S. based on its economy. I understand the budget request 
regarding defense spending affects the federal budget, however, in his introductory 
speech for the FY 2021 budget request document, President Trump places his concerns 
on the economy and its well-being. The FY 2021 Budget outlines that heightened defense 
capabilities requires necessary resources for the United States to maintain and expand 
economic interests.  
I presume that the Trump Administration is defined by the improvements it has 
made for the U.S. economy and will push boundaries to maintain their reputation which 
has been continuously publicized. In the FY 2021 Budget Request, President Trump 
constantly brings attention to the economic obstacles and expectations faced by the U.S., 
which has been surpassed under his executive command. The FY 2021 budget notes that 
un-employment is decreasing because the number of Americans working today has 
surpassed any other amount is U.S. history.63 In Heo and Bohte’s journal article, Who 
Pays for National Defense? Financing Defense Programs in the United States, 1947—
2007, the authors explain that presidents utilize defense spending to reduce 
unemployment in order to enhance their job approval and reelection potential. 
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Additionally, presidents increase defense expenditure to stimulate the economy because it 
is the largest discretionary spending fund for presidents to use at their disposition.64  
This is additional information to, once again, validate that there is a relationship 
between policymaking and defense spending in the U.S. Policymakers, the MIC, and 
other beneficiaries use their internal pressure and take advantage to drive an increase in 
the U.S. defense budget. Throughout this paper, the PET perspective provides a great 
deal of insight and clarity as to why and how there is appropriated increased funding to 
the defense budget. The research on PET helped me come the conclusion of the ultimate 
and responsible elements for increased defense expenditure, which are policymakers and 
policymaking subsystems. The United States should focus on the premise of defense 
spending, as author Travis Sharp referenced aforehand, “As threats evolve, funding 
should evolve along with them. In short, defense spending should be determined 
according to a threat-based analysis and budgetary survival of the fittest.”65 The takeaway 
from this is, if the U.S. focused on the referenced premise, there would be lack of 
secrecy, more transparency, and quite possibly more stabilization within composing the 
defense budget.  
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